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Abstract 
We advance a new account of why people endorse conspiracy theories, arguing that 
individuals use the social-cognitive tool of projection when making social judgments about 
others.  In two studies, we found that individuals were more likely to endorse conspiracy 
theories if they thought they would be willing, personally, to participate in the alleged 
conspiracies.  Study 1 established an association between conspiracy beliefs and personal 
willingness to conspire, that fully mediated a relationship between Machiavellianism and 
conspiracy beliefs.  In Study 2, participants primed with their own morality were less inclined 
than controls to endorse conspiracy theories – a finding fully mediated by personal 
willingness to conspire.  These results suggest that some people think “they conspired” 
because they think “I would conspire”.   
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Does it take one to know one?  Endorsement of conspiracy theories is influenced by personal 
willingness to conspire 
Were the September 11 attacks orchestrated by the United States government?  Was 
Diana, Princess of Wales murdered?  Alongside mainstream accounts of significant events, 
there often develop alternative accounts that fall under the banner of the popular term 
conspiracy theories.  A conspiracy theory is defined as an attempt to explain the ultimate 
cause of a significant political or social event as a secret plot by a covert alliance of powerful 
individuals or organizations (e.g., McCauley & Jacques, 1979).  It is important to stress that 
not all conspiracies are crackpot theories: some have ultimately been verified, such as the 
Watergate conspiracy of the 1970s.  However, in the main conspiracy theories are unproven, 
often rather fanciful alternatives to mainstream accounts (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).  
Whatever psychologists might think of conspiracy theories, there are good reasons to 
study them.  For one, conspiracy theories are capable of influencing people without their 
awareness.  After exposure to conspiracy theories about the death of Diana, Princess of 
Wales, British participants were more inclined to endorse those theories, but thought that their 
beliefs had not changed (Douglas & Sutton, 2008).  Further, correlational studies point to the 
role of psychological traits such as anomie and a chronic lack of trust in others in the 
tendency to adopt conspiracy theories (Goertzel, 1994; Leman & Cineralla, 2005; Swami, 
Chamarro-Premuzic & Furnham, in press).  Other studies show that conspiracy theories may 
allow people to come to terms with a powerless social position (Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax 
& Blain, 1999; Parsons, Simmons, Shinhoster & Kilburn, 1999; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).  
Further, research also shows that the popularity of conspiracy theories has increased in recent 
years (McHoskey, 1995), most likely due to the ease with which they are disseminated on the 
Internet (Coady, 2006).  It is therefore surprising that so little research has attempted to 
understand the social-psychological processes that underlie conspiracy theorizing.   
                                                                                     Conspiracy theories 4
In this paper, we propose a social-psychological mechanism which entails that 
people’s endorsement of conspiracy theories depends, in part, on whether they themselves are 
willing to conspire.  Our logic is as follows.  People are desirous of explanations for socially 
significant, emotionally arousing events such as the deaths of celebrities or major 
international disasters (Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; Weiner, 1985).  For such events, people 
generally lack direct access to the facts that might help them distinguish correct from 
incorrect explanations.  Instead, they are required to rely on a matrix of often conflicting 
information from various media sources, ranging from news reports to official inquiries, to 
rumour and conspiracy on the Internet to understand what people might have done (e.g., 
Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; Wallace, 2001).   
One social-cognitive tool that can help people in such situations is projection (Ames, 
2004; Krueger, 2000; McCloskey, 1958).  Projection is the process whereby one’s own 
thoughts, feelings, motivations or action tendencies are attributed to others.  Under the 
influence of Freud (1896), early theorists saw projection as a defence mechanism in which 
people denied their unwanted desires and motivations by ascribing them to others 
(McCloskey, 1958).  In contrast, contemporary models tend to view projection as a means of 
making sense of the social environment, informing judgments about others when more 
reliable or objective information is lacking (Ames, 2004).  The crucial point of the proposed 
theoretical account is that when evaluating a conspiracy theory, people may use projection as 
a tool to understand what others might have done.  Thus, for example, they may be less likely 
to dismiss the hypothesis that AIDS was created by government scientists if they believe that 
they personally would be willing to create it.  In this way, the observer’s perception that “I 
would do it” informs his or her perception that “they did it”.  We tested this process in two 
studies, assuming that individuals’ willingness to conspire is determined by their own 
personal morality (cf. Bandura, 2006; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).  Those who have relatively 
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few moral scruples about conspiring may be less likely to think that others would be deterred 
from conspiring, at least on moral grounds.   
The first study took a correlational approach.  We predicted that endorsement of a 
range of conspiracy theories would be positively correlated with participants’ perception that, 
if in the same position themselves, they would personally engage in such conspiracies. We 
also predicted that because of this relationship, a specific individual differences variable 
associated with personal morality would be related to conspiracy theorizing.  Here, we chose 
to measure participants’ level of Machiavellianism – an individual differences variable 
associated with willingness to exploit others for personal gain (Christie & Geis, 1970; 
Hodson, Hogg & MacInnis, 2009).  Machiavellianism is a clear indicator of a person’s moral 
tendencies and is therefore a useful measure to include in our initial investigation.  It provides 
an opportunity to test the prediction that the relationship between a person’s moral qualities 
and their beliefs in conspiracy theories is mediated by projection of those moral qualities onto 
others.  The second study adopted the same mediational logic in an experimental study.  Here, 
participants were primed with their personal morality by recalling a time they helped someone 
in a significant way.  We expected this prime to render participants temporarily less willing to 
conspire and thus be more skeptical toward conspiracy theories.  In other words, we expected 
the effect of positive moral priming on conspiracy beliefs to be mediated by willingness to 
participate in the alleged conspiracies.    
Study 1 
Participants and design 
Participants were 189 British undergraduates (163 female and 26 male; mean age 
20.13, SD = 3.87) who participated for course credit.  Machiavellianism was the predictor 
variable and endorsement of conspiracy theories the criterion variable.  Participants’ reported 
willingness to conspire was measured as the mediator.   
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Materials and procedure 
Participants were asked to complete the MACH-IV scale (Christie & Geis, 1970) 
where they read 20 statements (e.g., “Never tell anyone the real reason you did something 
unless it is useful to do so” α = .70) and rated their agreement with each statement on a scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).  Participants were then asked to read a series 
of conspiracy theory statements adapted from previous research (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; 
Leman & Cinnirella, 2005).  There were 17 statements (e.g., “The attack on the Twin Towers 
was not a terrorist action but a governmental conspiracy”).  For each item, participants were 
asked to rate the likelihood that, if they were in the position of the alleged conspirators, they 
would have participated in the actions (e.g., “If you were in the position of the government, 
would you have ordered the attack on the Twin Towers?” from 1 (never under any 
circumstances) to 7 (probably yes).  Across the conspiracy theories, the scale for willingness 
to conspire was reliable (α = .82).  Participants were also asked to rate how much they agreed 
with each statement – that is, to what extent they agreed that a conspiracy occurred – and also 
to rate how plausible, convincing, worth considering, interesting and coherent they thought 
each statement was, each on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).  A total measure of 
conspiracy theory endorsement was calculated for each statement across these six items and 
the scale across the 17 conspiracy theories was reliable (α = .82).   
Results and discussion 
 Mean conspiracy theory endorsement was 3.45 (SD = 0.69) and mean personal 
willingness to conspire was 1.99 (SD = 0.79).  To test the predicted pattern of mediation, we 
used the regression procedures recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986).  First, 
Machiavellianism (predictor) predicted endorsement of conspiracy theories (criterion), β = 
.237, t = 3.28, p = .001, R2 = .06.  Further, Machiavellianism was positively associated with 
participants’ perception that they would themselves participate in the alleged conspiracies 
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(mediator), β = .397, t = 5.81, p < .001, R2 = .16.  When reported willingness to conspire was 
entered into the equation with Machiavellianism, the effect of Machiavellianism on 
conspiracy beliefs was obviated, β = .078, t = 1.07, p = .285, R2 = .01, whereas the effect of 
willingness to conspire remained significant, β = .400, t = 5.46, p < .001, R2 = .19.  This 
complete mediation was confirmed by a Sobel test (z = 3.98, p < .001) and is presented in 
Figure 1.  Therefore, as expected these results revealed that personal willingness to engage in 
the conspiracies predicted endorsement of conspiracy theories.  Machiavellianism also 
predicted endorsement of conspiracy theories.  Finally, the relationship between 
Machiavellianism and conspiracy beliefs was fully mediated by participants’ willingness to 
engage in the conspiracies themselves.  In other words for example, highly Machiavellian 
individuals were seemingly more likely to believe that that government agents staged the 9/11 
attacks because they were more likely to perceive that they would do so themselves, if in the 
government’s position.   
The present results are important because they provide the first evidence to suggest 
that people endorse conspiracy theories because they project their own moral tendencies onto 
the supposed conspirators.  Of course however, this is a correlational study and so causality 
cannot be inferred.  In Study 2, we therefore aimed to investigate the causal relationship 
between a person’s morality, willingness to conspire and conspiracy beliefs in an 
experimental study.   
Study 2 
 Instead of measuring participants’ moral tendencies, we directly manipulated 
participants’ perception of their own personal morality.  Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of two conditions. An experimental group was asked to think of, and write about, a 
time when they behaved in a moral and decent manner, by helping another person.  According 
to self-perception theory (Bem, 1967; 1972), people infer their attitudes and dispositions by 
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observing their own behaviour.  So, we reasoned that by recalling a time when they behaved 
in a moral and decent manner, people would therefore perceive themselves as less likely to 
participate in conspiracies. A control group completed dependent measures without being 
exposed to this procedure.  
Participants were then asked to read the conspiracy theory statements as in Study 1 
and again rate (a) their willingness to engage in each conspiracy, and (b) how much they 
endorse each theory.  It was predicted that participants in the positive moral prime condition 
would endorse conspiracy theories to a lesser degree than those in the control condition.  It 
was also predicted that willingness to engage in the conspiracies would predict endorsement 
of conspiracy theories.  Finally, it was predicted that the effect of moral prime on conspiracy 
beliefs would be mediated by willingness to engage in the conspiracies.  
Participants and design 
 Sixty British undergraduates (48 female and 12 male) participated for course credit 
(mean age = 19.83, SD = 2.37).  The independent variable was the moral prime (vs. control) 
condition and endorsement of conspiracy theories was again the dependent variable.  
Participants’ reported willingness to conspire was again measured as the mediator. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants in the experimental condition were asked to think of, and write about a 
time where they helped another person while participants in the control group proceeded 
directly to the next section.  The specific wording of the instruction for the experimental 
group was as follows: 
In the first part of this experiment, we would like you to spend a few minutes thinking 
of a time when you helped someone out.  For example, you may have gone out of your 
way to help a friend in need, or gave them emotional support at a difficult time, made 
them feel better about themselves or their situation, or donated a significant amount of 
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money or time to help someone solve a problem.  It doesn’t matter how you helped 
them exactly – what we are interested in is any case in which you helped someone in 
some significant way.  Please, write about this time below.  We are interested in the 
details of this experience, so (without naming names), please write down some of the 
details of this experience.   
Participants then wrote their responses.  To establish that the experimental condition did not 
influence participants’ mood and potentially confound the results, all participants then 
completed the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) 
where they were asked to indicate from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely), the 
extent to which they were, at that moment, experiencing 10 positive (e.g., “excited”, α = .85) 
and 10 negative (e.g., “upset”, α = .82) emotions.  Participants were then asked to read the 17 
conspiracy statements as in Study 1 and were again asked to indicate how likely it is that, if 
they had been in the position of the alleged conspirators, they would have participated in the 
conspiracies.  As in Study 1, participants were asked to rate their endorsement of each 
statement.    
Results and discussion 
The moral prime condition had no effect on positive affect, F(1,59) = 0.99, p = .323, 
η
2
 = .02 or negative affect, F(1,59) = 0.41, p = .525, η2 = .01, so participants’ PANAS results 
were not included in subsequent analyses.   
To test the predicted pattern of mediation, we used the regression procedures 
recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) as in Study 1.  First, moral prime (independent 
variable) predicted endorsement of conspiracy theories (dependent variable), β = .272, t = 
2.15, p = .036, R2 = .07, such that participants in the positive moral prime condition endorsed 
conspiracy theories to a lesser extent (M = 3.17, SD = .76), than participants in the control 
condition (M = 3.59, SD = .75) – see Figure 2.  Moral prime also predicted participants’ 
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reported likelihood of willingness to conspire (mediator), β = .321, t = 2.71, p = .022, R2 = 
.10, where participants in the positive moral prime condition rated that, if they were in the 
position of the alleged conspirator, they would be less likely to perform the conspiratorial 
behaviour, (M = 1.91, SD = .69) than participants in the control condition (M = 2.42, SD = 
.85) – see Figure 2.  When the proposed mediator was added to the model, the effect of the 
positive moral prime on endorsement of conspiracy theories was obviated, β = .046, t = 0.37, 
p = .717, R2 = .002 while the effect of the mediator remained strongly significant, β = .628, t = 
4.96, p < .001, R2 = .39.  This complete mediation was confirmed by a Sobel test, z = 2.14, p 
= .032 and is presented in Figure 3.  Therefore, the effect of participants’ primed morality on 
their conspiracy beliefs was fully mediated by their own personal willingness to conspire. 
General discussion 
 The present two studies were designed to test a new explanation for why people 
endorse conspiracy theories.  Specifically, drawing on the literature on projection (e.g., Ames, 
2004), we argued that people would be more likely to endorse conspiracy theories to the 
extent that they project their own willingness to conspire onto the alleged conspirators.  We 
found support for this account.  In Study 1, the relationship between an indicator of personal 
moral tendencies (Machiavellianism) and endorsement of conspiracy theories was fully 
mediated by the participants’ own reported willingness to engage in the conspiracies.  In 
Study 2 we experimentally manipulated a proxy for participants’ personal morality and found 
that the effect of this prime on conspiracy beliefs was fully mediated by participants’ reported 
willingness to engage in the conspiracies.  Together, these studies suggest that people who 
have more lax personal morality may endorse conspiracy theories to a greater extent because 
they are, on average, more willing to participate in the conspiracies themselves.   
Researchers to date have been concerned with individual differences in conspiracy 
beliefs (e.g., Crocker et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Leman & Cinnirella, 2005; Parsons et al., 
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1999; Swami et al., in press; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) and indeed there is a growing 
psychological ‘profile’ of the typical conspiracy theorist.  Our findings extend this literature 
by highlighting the role that projection, a well-documented social-cognitive process, plays in 
conspiracy beliefs.  This process was able to account for the effect of both an individual 
difference (Study 1) and a situational variable (Study 2) on conspiracy theorizing.  Notably, in 
our studies participants consciously acknowledged their personal willingness to conspire, 
which led them to endorse conspiracy theories.  This pattern of results suggests that 
participants did not project their unacknowledged and unwanted psychological states onto 
others.  Rather, it is consistent with the contemporary understanding of projection as a social-
cognitive mechanism that helps perceivers make sense of a complex social environment and 
to understand other people’s behaviours (e.g., Ames, 2004).   
Our explanation is also a significant advance on previous research, which has typically 
treated conspiracy beliefs as a direct consequence of individual deficits (e.g., mistrust; 
Goertzel, 1994) or pathologies (e.g., paranoia; Knight, 2002).  Consistent with that research, 
we found that an individual difference variable (in this case Machiavellianism) significantly 
predicted conspiracy beliefs (β = .237 in Study 1).  However, reported willingness to 
participate in the conspiracy was a stronger predictor (β = .400 in Study 1 and β = .628 in 
Study 2) and fully accounted for the link between Machiavellianism and conspiracy beliefs.   
Future research may extend this new account to explain the links between other individual 
differences variables and conspiracy beliefs.  Theoretically we expect projection to mediate 
the effects on conspiracy theorizing of other individual differences that influence personal 
willingness to conspire.  For example, conscientiousness and empathic concern may be 
inversely related to willingness to conspire and because of this, to endorsement of conspiracy 
theories.   
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Future research may also examine the influence of other variables on conspiracy 
beliefs, adopting the current methodology and focus on the role of projection.  Future research 
may also extend the current account by testing different samples (e.g., non-undergraduate 
students) or a broader range of conspiracy theories.  Related to this last point, although the 
conspiracy theories tested in the current study are concerned with powerful, malign forces and 
negative motives, not all conspiracy theories fall into this category.  For example, it could be 
argued that alleged conspiracies about the existence of aliens result from a protective motive 
to avoid mass panic.  We do not characterize projection specifically as the attribution of 
unwanted tendencies of the self to others, so we would expect beliefs even in these benign 
conspiracies to be predicted by personal willingness to participate in them.  However we 
would not expect beliefs in such conspiracy theories nor willingness to participate in 
relatively benign conspiracies to be predicted by Machiavellianism nor by our moral prime.  
This is because their moral implications are very different from the malign conspiracies 
presented in the present studies.  Future research could examine these possibilities. 
Further, the use of alternative dependent measures may enable researchers to examine 
potentially more complex relationships between personal morality and conspiracy beliefs.  
Specifically, we found that priming morality leads people to perceive that they are less likely 
to conspire (Study 2).  This is consistent with the notion that these sorts of manipulations 
allow people to establish their moral credentials (e.g., Harber, Stafford, & Kennedy, 2010).  
We also found that this strengthened sense of personal morality leads people to perceive that 
others were less likely to conspire.  Ironically however, affirming personal morality can 
sometimes give people an unconscious ethical license to behave negatively (Monin & Miller. 
2001).  So, it is possible that measuring conspiratorial behaviour may reveal that affirming 
personal morality is a double edged-sword, which at once makes people feel that they would 
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be less likely to engage in conspiracies and makes them actually more likely to conspire, 
should an opportunity present itself.   
Finally, we do not argue that projection alone explains why people believe in 
conspiracy theories. Although the relationship between personal willingness to conspire and 
endorsement of conspiracy theories was strong in both studies presented here, other 
psychological processes may also influence beliefs in conspiracy theories.  It may be that 
projection explains beliefs in some conspiracy theories and for some people better than others.  
It will therefore be important in future research to examine the role of psychological processes 
other than projection in influencing beliefs in conspiracy theories.  
In summary, the present studies provide the first evidence that at least among some 
samples and for some conspiracy theories, the perception that “they did it” is fuelled by the 
perception that “I would do it”.  This research opens up new possibilities for understanding 
people’s beliefs in conspiracy theories.   
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Figure 1.  The association between Machiavellianism and endorsement of consp
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Figure 2.  Mean willingness to conspire and mean conspiracy theory endorsement as a 















                                                                                     
Figure 3.  The effect of moral prime on endorsement of conspiracy theories is fully mediated 
by participants’ personal willingness to conspire.
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